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Abstract
During the last decade, there is observed an increasing interest for Social Network Service (SNS)
like Facebook, Google+ and similar online social networking platforms. It is clearly a trend that
the number of SNS is growing increasingly. SNS have successfully migrated into people’s lives
and provide social online networking platforms with different features and design. Normally, SNS
do not share information. Interoperability across SNS is unavailable. Therefore, many of SNS
users own several accounts in order to access different services with duplicate account information.
Under such circumstances, there has been a growing public fascination with the comprehensive
standardization of SNS. What happens if standardization enters the current market?
SNS standard is defined as a technical standard that aims to provide a simplified and user-friendly
environment that diminish the limitations of interoperability across different SNS. There are many
attempts in order to realize SNS standardazation, but none of them have archive a globally success,
as the drawbacks are plenty and a proper prototype is not officially recognized and deployed by any
providers.
Based on the theoretical concepts and simulation analysis, this thesis has elaborate and analyze
the effect on standardization on then SNS market, providers and competition. In order to generate a
market analysis, a DEMOS-based simulation is modeled and used based on three market scenarios.
Together with the simulation results, a business model and game theoretical analysis are presented
for measurements on strategic management.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter, the background, motivation, limitation and structure of the thesis are presented.
1.1 Background
Social Network Service (SNS) was first introduced at the year of 1995, known as a online web-
site and platform that provides service for social networking purpose. SNS has marked its growth
through historical innovative improvements since its launch. The earliest SNS was Theglobe.com1,
which offered a generalization of simple online communities. The opportunities SNS could provide
were limited due to technical limitations of internet at that time. As a result of the rapid growth
and revolution of internet, through the years of development, it was flourished a new generation
of SNS. SNS of various types are designed for unique networking purpose. SNS can now offer
services from for example job hunting to exclusive dating. Not surprisingly, the new generation of
SNS is gradually receiving increased attention by people.
There is not any common standard since the first SNS came into market. For instance, Facebook
(FB)2 and Google+3 are operating on their own architecture, and it is impossible for interconnection
between those services. From technical point of view, design and implementation of standardiza-
tion is a major challenge. For example, this challenge could appear in information integration, in
where one SNS needs to adopt information from another. Also, due to incompatibility of individual
design architecture, some related users data could not be compatible.
Without standardization, the winner-takes-it-all situation may be a common market phenomenon,
as the market development of any involved providers are depending on the network effects. Under
such circumstances, the amount of users using same service affects the benefits of consumption.
Some of the SNS could gain profits from their increasing amount of users at the influence of pos-
itive network effects. Positive network effects arise when the utility of a service increases as the
number of users grows. Other benefits for SNS can also arise when the increasing amount of users
1http://www.theglobe.com/
2http://www.facebook.com
3http://www.googleplus.com
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leads to lock-in effect. Users could be gradually locked in to some services, as their valuable user
information is centralized in those particular services. Competition between different SNS often
results in which the SNS that already establishes a large base of users receives most returns, thus
the competitors could be wiped out of the market. Consequently, SNS business model is greatly
affected by the lack of standardization.
As the times goes, the public fascination with the comprehensive standardization of SNS is growing
in which could solve the major user experience problems when using different SNS. SNS standard
plays an important role in SNS industry. It is emerging as a significant innovative step of taking
SNS to a better and higher level of user experience. Standardization is considered to be a rational
game between the providers involved[1]. In management of decision-making under standardiza-
tion, the seven key assets are used to exhibit major factor of winning a standard competition play
an important role[2]. Apparently, standardization could also affect the firm’s strategy to win the
competition. Theories and strategy-making commonly used in standard competition are generally
based on game theory. Game theory is designed to illustrate the outcomes of competitive parties
decisions are depending on the interacting competitors[3]. In this thesis, it examines the SNS mar-
ket with standardization as a strategy-making process and analysis of the possible impact that could
occur as the outcome of standardization.
1.2 Motivation
Standard in SNS is not only dealing with the technical design architecture, it also combines with the
management of strategy for actors involved. Standardization means a process of standard-making.
As the existing market shows that a common standard is not been deployed, standardization could
involve a challenge for related actors to adapt the new rules in order to encounter the competition.
The major challenge is lying on strategic management once the standardization is deployed. For
competitors who are seeking economic benefits, it is clearly that they have to identify themselves
through continually analysis of the market. What step it should be taken in terms of cooperation
and reconstruction of strategic model remains in actors’ focus. The potential for nowadays under-
taken actor to win back the competition is as much as for the existing winner to lose its market
share, since the rules could possibly change. The effects that standardization causes the market
must be thoroughly elaborated and analyzed. And it is useful to address and calculate the conse-
quences of each decision made by each actor. Despite standardization could change the situation
of market share, prediction and comparison of decision-making could assist both large and small
actors to improve their strategies. All these mentioned above are the main drivers for illustration of
the market situation with standardization .
The most of actors nowadays are running their own business independently and simultaneously,
as the technical limitations do not provide them to interconnect. The size of SNS is what it mat-
ters in the current market. The winner-takes-it-all situation seems to hide the potentials of SNS.
Nonetheless, it is believed that the potential of gaining economic benefits and technical improve-
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ments has not been completely realized due to the lack of standardization.
1.3 Limitation
This thesis will focus on the SNS standard and also its impact in terms of strategic management
and benefits for providers in the market. It illustrates the SNS market evolution under the effects
of standardization based on empirical study. Through author’s research and observations, the data
is collected from market simulation. In order to determine the outcome of each decision-making
of actors, a simulation tool is used based on specific requirements of market situation and at a de-
fined level of hyphenation. The generated market simulation data is also used in SNS companies’
strategic management analysis and performance measurement. The elaboration of the impact is
also examined based on combination of literature review, author’s opinions and assumptions for
future development.
Due to the limited time available for this thesis, the limitations will be listed as follow:
• Only a few actors will be considered in market simulation. They will, in other words, stand
for actors in two groups, large and small.
• Assumptions are made in order to simulate the market situation. The assumptions are based
on time perspective and size of services.
• Future development will also be depicted in simulation.
• Only the future strategic and development of SNS which take part into standardization will
be elaborated. This thesis discusses the evolution as an outcome of SNS standardization.
• Capacity or other detail technical implementation and design of SNS standard will not be
studied, as they are beyond the scope of this thesis.
1.4 Contribution
The contribution of the study is shown as follow:
• A theory part is consisting of theoretical definitions, descriptions of academic theory in eco-
nomics, and distinct properties are described using relevant literature and research made by
the author.
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• Technical standards and SNS standard are differentiated and summarized through theoretical
and empirical findings.
• SNS market with and without standardization and a mix market are illustrated as three dif-
ferent scenarios. They are modeled and simulated with DEMOS-based simulation.
• SNS market evolution is elaborated and discussed by referring strategic management accord-
ing to game theory, as well as author’s opinion and simulation result of future development
of SNS market with standard. The result of simulation is also depicted under several circum-
stances.
1.5 Methodology
1.5.1 Demos simulation
The simulation will take several actors into consideration. Base on different inputs that include for
example time and initial user amount, it simulates the development of entire market distribution for
distinct providers. The simulation is basically used to demonstrate and exhibit the development of
different providers under feedback and churning. The illustration will also suggest further steps in
decision-making caused by standardization. The simulation code is based on a implemented sim-
ulation program developed by associate professor, Harald Øverby, from Norwegian Science and
Technology University, which later improved and featured by the thesis’s author.
1.5.2 Business model
The business model used to examine and analyze the providers’ strategies is based on Osterwalder’s
business model ontology. The business model canvas is used as a framework to illustrate for exam-
ple revenue stream, cost and etc. for SNS providers.
1.5.3 Game theory Analysis
In order to analyze the decision making of individual provider at a standardized SNS market, a
reconstruction of strategic management is created for both large and small actors. For each actor it
analyzes and compares the benefits of each movement of decision with and without standardization
based on the theoretical evaluation of game theory.
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1.6 Organization
The thesis refers to several academic literature and reports. It illustrates more specifically on the
problem description based on the provided information collected from relevant academic textbooks
and universities’ library database.
The thesis is organized as follow. Firstly, a theory part of different definitions are studied and
given a brief description. Secondly, it addresses the differences between general technical standard
and SNS standard based on empirical and historical findings. Thirdly, the impacts of SNS standard
are shown in simulation results and described based on game theory and business model. Finally,
the conclusion and further work is addressed.
Chapter 2
Theory
In this chapter, it will present some general theoretical definitions of economic concepts related
to SNS industry, as a fundamental needed for further empirical study. It also gives a picture about
what kind of economic effects SNS are dealing with and typical strategic management in SNS busi-
ness plan. Furthermore, it provides the knowledge and insights based on literature review.
2.1 Network effects
In many industries, individuals might appear to imitate the behavior of others. For instance, this
phenomenon appears when a consumer, at some kinds of decision, receives an explicit benefit of
economic or other factors when he/she coordinates his/her behavior with others’ behavior. The
reason behind this phenomenon is called network effects, also called direct-benefits effects. In
general, network effects arise specially in compatible systems in where the interaction with other
consumers is relative important. The effects are also addressed as externalities. An externality is in
which the welfare of an individual have impacts on others without mutually compensation[3].
An obvious approach to examining network effects is to view the consumers’ behavior in the mar-
ket. Without network effects, consumers barely care about the amount of the same good other
consumers are purchasing. For instance, there is a huge number of potential consumers, each of
them have relative little influence on the aggregated consumption on the entire market. Each of in-
dividual purchases for example apple cares barely about if his consumption will affect anything of
the current price of the apple. The impact of each individual’s decision has relative small influence
and effect on the good’s popularity and price. Furthermore, consumers’ personal need and interest
plays an important role and is normally variable from one to others. The reservation price for a
good a consumer is willing to pay for is the major factor in whether he will purchase the good.
Nevertheless, a consumer’s willingness to purchase a good is not affected by the amount of the
good sold to others.
Unlike the market with no network effects, the economy with network effects is modeled regard-
ing to the aggregated popularity of a good as well as consumers’ personal intrinsic interest. With
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network effects, a potential consumer will take into account both his own affordable level of price
and the good or service’s total number of consumers. Each individual’s willingness to purchase
a good is normally determined by the aggregated interest of the good. The aggregated popularity
contributes effectively to the incline of the number of consumers joining the market. As noted
earlier, an externality occurs when welfare of individual is affected by the behavior of others. The
increasing amount of consumers in the shown area has affected the increment of others’ welfare of
purchasing the same good. In the sense of incremented welfare, it is called positive externalities.
The effects associated with the positive externalities are basically the function of network size. As
the consumers increases, means the size grows, which in turn affect the popularity. The positive ex-
ternalities can usually be found in the markets where amount of consumers is driven by the good’s
total popularity, especially at a good that is new piece of technology or SNS. Microsoft product
that owns a large installed base of consumers, attract an increasing amount of new consumers as its
product receives a high demand from the market. Furthermore, each good or service has its own
value based on the aggregated interest from entire market. An incremental consumer contributes to
growth of the good’s value. The concept of value is abstract in this context, but it can be exhibited
in the sense of amount of total related objects. The value of a consumer network can be calculated
using distinct network laws, shown as follow,
Value of a network, n = users:
• Sarnoff’s law, v(n) = n
• Odlyzko-Tilly, v(n) = nlogn
• Metcalfe’s law, v(n) = n(n−1)/2 = O(n2)
• Reeds law, v(n) = 2n
Figure 2.1 illustrates the development of network value over size of network using different calcu-
lating methods.
David Sarnoff1 presented the Sarnoff’s law that estimates the broadcast network value. As the
function of Sarnoff’s law illustrates, the value of a broadcast network is typically to be propor-
tional to the number of users[5]. The audience of radio and television broadcasting creates a larger
network of consumers that easily attract advertisers.
Metcalfe2’s law is applied in where communication networks allow free interactions between users.
The value of a network is proportionate to the number of connections between users. Connections
1David Sarnoff, the American radio and television pioneer.
2Robert Metcalfe, graduated from MIT in 1969 with two B.S. degrees, one in Electrical Engineering and the other
in Industrial Management from the MIT Sloan School of Management.
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Figure 2.1: Effects calculated by different methods[4]
are basically made between pairs of involved users. Due to the failure of telecom booms, the growth
in Metcalf’s law, as noted, is much slower than the one based on Sarnoff’s law[5].
Unlikely, Reed3’s law is intuitively applied in where communication network is consisting of
groups. As the formulation states, the network value can scale more than the mentioned laws.
The forming of 2n groups is the concept behind Reed’s law, and the value of network is growing in
size of 2n. The fundamental concept underlying the Reed’s law is in assumption that the value of a
network is proportionate to the number of groups. The valuation methods are provided for different
types of purpose. They are addressed in figure 2.1 as follow.
Network layer Social Base Area
Political Network Sarnoff’s Law, N Publishing
Social Network Metcalfe’s Law, N2 Communication
Creative Network Reed’s Law, 2N Collaboration
Table 2.1: Different types of valuation of network and their applicable area[6]
A refutation of Metcalf’s law was addressed by Odlyzko4 and Tilly5, states that a better estimate
for value of networks through real world observations and interconnections can be improved by
3David R. Reed,
4Andrew Odlyzko, Digital Technology Center, University of Minnesota 499 Walter Library , 117 Pleasan t St. SE
Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA, odlyzko@umn.edu
5Benjamin Tilly, ben tilly@operamail.com
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another rule, nlogn[5]. Tilly and Odlyzko’s law is built on Zipf’s law and scales the user value as
logn. It describes a consistent rule of calculating network value of communication network.
The growth resulted by positive externalities could be considered as a disruptive movement, es-
pecially for providers that are not capable to incur a critical mass of consumers. Obtaining a
critical mass of consumers means a firm is successfully attracting popularity to maintain the incline
of total consumers over time. If it is fulfilled, the value of the providers’ consumer network might
be highly affected in such a manner that the growing path derives largely into a winner-takes-it-all
situation. A critical mass of consumers is gathered to form a network, and a positive externality is
effectively emerged which in turn creating a stronger incline of total number of consumers. As two
providers compete a small lead in market share, it may heighten one’s competitive position thus
assist it further increase its lead. Along with the proportional increasing consumers on one side, the
disruptiveness for the other one could be found intuitively. The growing path depicts the life cycle
for providers affected by network effects in Figure 2.2.
The technology adoption life cycle rolls on towards a dominant market. Positive externality fa-
vors big providers with large installed base of consumers. The effects undermine efficiently the
providers with less consumer network. Particularly in creating sustainable consumer network, ac-
cording to the phenomenon of later network effects, consumers connected to the dominant firm will
grow rapidly. Under such circumstances, the undermined firm will lose its the sufficient mass of
consumers and also the competitive fundamental. As the market development exhibits over time,
the different between providers will be clearly visible. Positive externalities magnify the effect of
economic shift, and the weakest will be driven out of the competition. An example of positive
externalities is video-cassette recorders. Two competing products were presented to consumers in
the market with the approximately same price. Each system competes for the market share that
increases the value of the given system thus also increase the probability of consumers purchasing
the same product.
Conventional consequences caused by network effects are based on the assumption of positive ex-
ternalities. Eventually, a negative externality could emerge to stabilize the economy for market
shares. Equilibrium is engendered by the offset of any generated changes. An example of nega-
tive externalities is traffic congestion. As the traffic of broadband is overloaded, consumers could
unfortunately experience loads of delay, thus decreasing the level of user-experience. The number
of participants increases leads to the payoffs of participating in the underlying activity decreases[3].
Until now, positive and negative externalities are presented. But in many real situations, Both
types of externalities would seem to appear simultaneously. As noted, the more consumers a firm
could attract to its service, the better it will be, thus generating positive externalities. But it is
pleasant provided it does not exceed the limit and emerge congestion. If congestion is occurred,
that might decrease the user-experience thus causing negative externalities. The reason behind this
is the user participation level of a certain service.
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Figure 2.2: Positive externality
2.2 Lock-in effects and churning
Other relevant economic effects triggered by network effects are lock-in effects. Lock-in effects
enable providers to lock consumers to their services or purchase their goods, as they offer exclu-
sivity or reasonable prices to capture consumers. Strategies of lock-in effects are usually applied
to consumers, and by providers that have intention to avoid or at least reduce the impact in terms
of loss of users to competitors[7]. Churning is the result of lock-in effects, as it addresses the
amount of consumers of a given firm switch to another service or product. Normally, providers
would experience loss of a certain percentage of users depending on the strength of lock-in effects.
To avoid churning, it means against the loss of users to other providers, the level of subsidization
to consumers remains as a costly and challenging problem. Furthermore, the switching cost that
assumes the cost of changing supplier is determent in lock-in effects.
An example of lock-in effects is occurred at the Bell Atlantic case[2]. Bell Atlantic purchased
switches from AT&T in late 1980. The company paid approximately 3 billion dollars on the invest-
ment. Due to the proprietary solution of the system provided by AT&T, it only offered expensive
software enhancements and monopolization at upgrades and aftermarket. The switching cost for
Bell Atlantic was highly costly and caused that Bell Atlantic was lock-in to AT&T.
Typically, switching cost could be covered by many lock-in alternatives as providers are willing
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to strengthen consumers’ loyalty by subsidization. Some of them are illustrated in the table shown
in Table 2.2.
providers - Consumers
Hardware Industry CD, DVD
Software Industry Online updates
Mobile Network Industry Loyalty programs
Table 2.2: Classification of lock-in
2.3 Business model
Alexander Osterwalder6 has given the most common and basic definition of a business model ac-
cording to Business Model Canvas[8]. Business model is modeled to illustrate the method and
process an organization uses to create, deliver and capture its value in terms of economic, cultural
and etc. The business model described here is based on “Business Model Generation”[8]. It depicts
nine major building blocks in a business model and the relationships between them. Figure 2.3 is
depicted based on Business Model Canvas.
• KEY PARTNERS, Who are the suppliers and partners?
• KEY ACTIVITIES, What are the important actions that must to be taken?
• KEY RESOURCES, What are the necessary assets?
• VALUE PROPOSITION, How to satisfy customer’s need?
• CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS, How to maintain customer relationship?
• CHANNELS, How to reach customers?
• CUSTOMERS, Who is the customers?
• COSTS, Where does the cost come from?
• REVENUE, Where does the revenue come from?
6Alexander Osterwalder, author of Business Model Canvas, read more at http://alexosterwalder.com/
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Figure 2.3: Business Model Canvas
2.4 Game theory
Interconnectedness in terms of behavior of several competitors is modeled in the language of game
theory.
Game Theory is “The study of strategic making and mathematical models of conflict and coop-
eration between intelligent rational decision makers” [9]
Game theory is applied widely in decision-making, the situations in which the outcome of an actor’s
decisions is depending on and being effected by the interacting competitors’ decision and behavior.
The basic idea of game theory is used in many contexts. A typical example is pricing of a homoge-
neous product among various providers in the same industry, which involves game-theoretic ideas.
Examples that regard to game theoretic ideas can be analyzed by the strategic element in game
theory.
In the definition of game theory, it usually considers an interacting game consisting of a set of
participants or actors before analyzing the consequence of a decision. Each actor has and can
choose between different decisions for their strategic behavior. Thus, a payoff is followed by each
selected choice of strategies and generally preferred to be maximized. As mentioned above, those
are the underlying assumptions for game theory in a game. En example of a game and predicted
outcome of each decision-making is described as follow in Table2.3.
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Player B
Player A
Presentation Exam
Presentation 90,90 86,92
Exam 92,86 88,88
Table 2.3: Exam or presentation?[3]
When analyzing the outcome illustrated above, it exhibits that player A has a strictly better option
regardless of what player B choose. It refers to a strictly dominant strategy[3], p143. that will
be played by player A in this case. A related problem that is similar to the mentioned case is the
famous example of game theory, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, illustrated in Table2.4.
Player 2
Player 1
Confess Don’t confess
Confess -6,-6 0,10
Don’t confess -10,0 -1,-1
Table 2.4: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma describes the payoff of the prisoners’ decision. The goal is to achieve
minimization of sanction, as the outcome is depending on the behavior of each prisoner. Based
on this example, there are two fundamental concepts used in reasoning of game theory, the best
response and dominant strategies [3] p146. A strategy of a paired strategy for one player is said
to be best response to another strategy of the same paired strategy for the opposite player when it
denotes at least a payoff as good as any other strategy of that paired. A strictly dominant strategy
is a strategy that is strictly best response to every strategy of the opposite player. When a strictly
dominant strategy is found, it is expected the player will play this strategy. Unlikely, a player can
have multiple dominant strategies that do not illustrate which one he would prefer to play.
Nash Equilibrium 7is developed to analyze a game when a strictly dominant strategy is not found in
a two-player game. It proposes that, “if there are no dominant strategies, we should expect players
to use strategies that are best response to each other.”[3] p150. Based on the assumptions of a pair
of strategies that are not best response to each other will not be believed by players to be used,
given the player will have the incentive to deviate to another strategy.
7Nash Equilibrium, developed and announced by John Nash who is an American scientist and mathematist. See
more at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nash_equilibrium
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Market entry game
Furthermore, for a large number of players to choose whether or not to undertake some activities or
decisions, we refer it to the common problem of market entry game[10]. It is a study about equilib-
rium behavior of a game and strategy management that explains and predicts how the factors such
as sufficiency and adequate interact. In a market entry game, there are a large number of players
in where their decision of whether to join the market or not have to be made independently and
simultaneously. Individual strategies about entering the market could generally affect the payoff
of each player. The major problem is in the structure of profit and consumers surplus. Determina-
tion of the effect of probability of entry, payoff, benefits and other relevant factors is essential for
analyzing a market entry game. It assists to develop and provide a fundamental insight about the
market situation and prediction of future phases. Based on the strategy made by player, it results in
different payoff, as illustrated in Table2.4.
Figure 2.4: Payoff of different strategy[10]
Coordination game
Coordination game considers the problem when there is more than one Nash Equilibrium. The goal
of both players is to coordinate on the same strategy[3] p151. Generally, there is two or more Nash
Equilibrium that maximizes their payoff of pair of decisions. Examples include when two machin-
ery producers have to decide whether to go for the standard or not for the homogenous products.
Focal point 8was introduced to solve problems that arise in this context. According to focal points,
it is not unusual that players focus on one Nash equilibrium based on the predicted conditions. For
instance, convention of social or other type can be a reason for mutually agreed equilibrium without
facing the difficulty of coordination problem.
Unbalance coordination games usually appear in reality, which means any equilibrium give higher
payoff to one of the players, or among the existing Nash equilibrium there is one that gives higher
payoff than others. The former one is traditionally called the Battle of the Sexes. Prediction on the
equilibrium is basically hard based on social convention. In these contexts, it becomes helpful to
gain information about the players and suggestions of coordinating variations. For the latter one,
a feature called intrinsic can be used to predict the equilibrium chosen by the players based on
individual social convention.
8Focal point was introduced by Thomas Schelling.
Chapter 3
Technical standards and Standardization
In this chapter, it will describe the definition of technical standard and standardization. It also
illustrates some examples of standards and standardization of telecommunication technology.
3.1 Definition of standard and technical standard
Generally, standard is defined as the outcome of standardization, a process of standard making.
Standardization is “the activity of establishing and recording a limited set of solutions to actual
and potential matching problems, directed at befits for the party or parties involved, balancing
their needs and intending and expecting that these solutions will be repeatedly or continuously
used during a certain period by a substantial number of the parties for whom they are meant.”[11]
Standards can be classified by the definitions concerning standards and interfaces[12] p191, and it
is addressed as follow,
• Standard, a set of technical specifications that can be adhered by a producer, tacitly or for-
mally.
• Compatibility standard, that defines one or more interfaces that enables interoperability.
• Open Standard, that defines a compatibility standard which is publicly available.
• Proprietary standard, those specifications are not publicly available.
• Sponsored standard, that covered by essential intellectual property rights
• De-jure standard, that is enforced by law.
• De-facto standard, that is broadly used in a certain industry.
• Formal standard, standarded by officially recognized standards body
• Interface, a set of specifications that defines the interoperability between certain entities of a
network
• Open interface, that is publicly available.
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For IT and telecommunication sector, specifications are usually defined by a provider or manufac-
turer, hence form a technical standard, which is not included in the definition above. According to
David and Steinmüller, a technical standard is therefore defined as the following,
“A set of technical specifications adhered to by a producer, either tacitly or as a result of a formal
agreement.”
Technical standards may exist in various forms, such as documents for both private and public
use. It can apply to for example operative systems, telecommunication infrastructure system such
as Global System for Mobile Communications(GSM) and Universal Mobile Telecommunications
System(UTMS), video cassette recorders and CD players. Products that share the same standard
are presented as compatible, in which interchangeability is commonly available. The geographi-
cally coordination problem such as technical barriers across borders, can be solved by deploying
a standard in different geographic levels as it offers a mutually compatibility. It can be defined
formally in categories of national, regional or international.
The primary types of technical standards are derived into the following1,
• Standard specification, that defines the requirements of physical material and performance.
• Standard test method, that applies a comprehensive description for method used to formalize
a test result.
• Standard practice or procedure, that defines a set of exact instructions or operation procedure.
• Standard guide, that contains information which is not required for specific action.
• Standard definition, that describes established terminology.
• Standard units, that refers to physical measurements.
Among the types of technical standards, they are classified in use of different way[11],
• Market competition involving products embodying unsupported standards.
• Market competition among sponsored standards(or proprietary standards).
• Agreements within voluntary standards-writing organizations
Other classifications of standards take the origin, level of enforceability, inclusion of Intellectual
property rights(IPR) and availability of a standard into account. The rise of technical standards
offers consumer benefits in numerous ways, such as higher flexibility while using products of one
standard and lower cost on interchanging of similar goods.
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technical_standard
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Through a set of development and implementation process, technical standards are presented as
a final result of standardization. Standardization is a procedure and exhibits the major challenge
of achievement of standard-making. For industries such as information technology, the influence
of technical standards has a huge potential impact on the relevant market. Slightly change in a
standard or standard-making could have highly affected the business strategies and the firm’s life
of survival in a competition. The creation of technical standards is a process of three activities[13],
shown as the following,
1. Involved actors create an artifacts that live up to the qualifications and requirements that
integrated the standard specifications.
2. A form of innovation from the existing technology.
3. Involved actors’ willingness to participate and support the new solution of current technology
that forms standardization.
Emergence of standardization is basically due to many factors such economic, strategic manage-
ment, social and political arguments. Technology that has been developed for a long enough period
and gradually being similar to each other, it is generally adapted by most of users and achieved
significant success. Environmental and socio factors potentially lead to the emergence of standard-
ization, as the technical standards provide compatibility that is logically necessary for sustaining
benefits.
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3.2 Technical standard in mobile network
In telecommunication industry, the development of technical standard plays an increasing impor-
tant role. GSM and UMTS are the typical mobile communication standards that mark the evolution
of telecommunication history. Mobile standards and standardization went through various phrases
and involves different types of actors. History of standardization of GSM and UMTS are described
in the following sections.
3.2.1 The emergence of GSM
Typically, only some selective groups of users had access to mobile telephony in the early 1980s.
During the decades mobile telephony was available for users, the capacity and coverage of the sys-
tem was limited. Due to the large consumption of power, it was only suitable for installation in
large equipments, vehicles or use in industries. The technical disadvantages caused by availability
of frequencies and radio base station, had continuously restricted the number of the users.
Nordic Mobile Telephone(NMT) introduced two new concepts in mobile communications: roam-
ing and handover. Roaming means that the user can move between different parts of the network,
in particular between networks of different operators, making or receiving calls without manually
updating the current location of the mobile terminal and this was impossible in the earlier manual
mobile systems. The location management is an automatic and autonomous process taking place
between the mobile terminal and the network without involvement of the user. Handover means
that if the terminal is moving from one radio cell to another during conversation, the call is not inter-
rupted but automatically handed over to the new base station. The user will not recognize that this
action takes place. NMT was put in operation in 1981 in the Nordic countries, and was the world’s
first automatic mobile telephone system. However, NMT never became a common European stan-
dard because different and incompatible systems were introduced in UK, Germany, France, and
Italy. NMT was also implemented in the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Spain. This situation led
the Netherlands PTT to propose that the European PTTs joined forces and specified a common
system for Europe in 1982. Roaming and handover as developed for NMT formed the basis of the
GSM system specifications. In the GSM system, the functions were improved, extended and sup-
plemented with several other autonomous functions. The work on the GSM standard started in 1982
in the European standards and policy organ The European Conference of Postal and Telecommu-
nications Administrations(CEPT) (later European Telecommunications Standards Institute(ETSI)).
The specification was finished in 1989 and the system was put in operation in 1991. While NMT
was a pure telephone system, GSM supported also data communication with speed up to about 10
kbps (limited by the bandwidth of the radio channel). Throughout the 1990s the data capacity was
extended by General packet radio service(GPRS) (where several basic radio channels were coupled
together) and EDGE (where less bandwidth-consuming modulation was introduced)[14].
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3.2.2 The rise of 3G and LTE
GSM has been the most common mobile standard that dominates the market, until Third generation
of mobile telecommunications technology(3G) is gradually deployed by the most of the countries.
It was first developed by the International Telecommunication Union(ITU) in the beginning of
1980s. The specifications and standards of 3G were nearly developed for 15 years and there are
many network systems that developed and branded as 3G. The first pre-commercial 3G network
was launched in Japan in 19982. UMTS that launched in 2001 and Code division multiple ac-
cess 2000(CDMA2000) in 2002 are some of the examples. Higher data rates and new frequency
bands are the most common characterizations of those mentioned 3G network systems. But the
adoption of 3G networks were slowly worldwide due to the unique radio frequencies. It required
new network infrastructure and license of new frequencies in order to provide higher transmission
rates. Therefore, the mentioned difficulties had become a barrier and halted the deployment of 3G.
During the last decades, 3G networks have experience a massive expansion and adopted by many
countries worldwide. An it was introduced gradually by the smart phones that combines mobile
broadband to the networks. The higher transmission speed and capability have make the growth of
3G becoming increasingly.
Furthermore, The fourth generation of mobile phone mobile communication technology(4G) came
as a successor of 3G networks thus presents the fourth generation of mobile phone mobile commu-
nication technology standards. It was first introduced by International Telecommunications Union-
Radio communications sector(ITU-R), as a International Mobile Telecommunications Advanced(IMT-
Advanced) specifications that provide peak speed at 100 Mbit/s and 1 Gbit/s for high and low mobil-
ity communication. 4G networks are known for providing mobile ultra-broadband, as it supports
high speed transmission that enables high definition mobile TV, video conferencing and etc. In
Norway and Sweden, Long Term Evolution (LTE) is the first-release 4G network. Mobile WiMax,
was first deployed in South Korea in 2006, later also deployed in U.S in 2010. 4G abandoned
the spread spectrum used in 3G and used Orthogonal frequency-division multiple access(OFDMA)
multi-carrier transmission and other Frequency-domain equalization(FDE) schemes in stead. Those
enable the high transmission rates together with Multiple-input multiple-output(MIMO) commu-
nications. The technologies used in 4G require less complexity for equalization at receiver. The
motivation for developing 3G and 4G systems was to increase the data rate over the radio connec-
tion, the reason being that GSM was unable to offer data rates that mobile internet applications
demanded. Nowadays, many countries have taken part into deployment of 4G networks and it is
believed that the technology will gradually adopted by the market.
As mentioned above, standardization of mobile network in Europe had been through several long-
term phases that required active involvement and contributions from many actors. Actors include
network operators; manufactures and European Community have played an important role in imple-
mentation and deployment. Adoption of technology by users outlined the success of the common
standard. The standard of mobile network is a complex system, the process of standardization can
be distinguished in following phases[12], (1) The development phase, in which technical, economic
2NTT DoCoMo launched the first 3G network and branded it as FOMA.
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and strategic design issues are considered and determined. (2) The Adoption Phase, in which the
involvement and contributions of relevant actors are in action. (3) The Diffusion phase, in which
the competitive technology must meet the market expectations.
Chapter 4
SNS standard
SNS standard is categorized under technical standard, as it requires a set of technical specifications
adhered to a provider or a formal agreement to be fulfilled and implemented. In information tech-
nology industry, standards play a highly significant role. SNS, as a newly developed IT service,
has received a rapid growth in number and acceptance. Despite the service is gaining enormous
attention, their proprietary standards restrict the interaction between different services. A common
standard is remained to be implemented and deployed. Consequently, the increasing number of
SNS has created an intense battlefield for any new incumbents and current providers, hence trig-
gers a typical winner-takes-it-all situation. A common standard of SNS would seem to diminish
this phenomena. SNS standard can emerge in different ways, and the form of these standards may
vary based on the main factors that carried out during standardization process. It is proposed in the
following section some variations of SNS standards by exploring the economic theory and technol-
ogy measurements.
4.1 Variation of SNS standards
4.1.1 De-facto standard
De-facto standards used to emerge in market with a leading provider that owns a large installed
base of customers. It is described as a custom standard that achieved an initial lead in the market
by adoption of the customers; hence in turn increase the attractiveness to third parties to support the
standard. The network effects that amplify the popularity and encourage even more new customers
until other standards are driven out of the competition. It is used to describe the dominant standard
when the number of standard are more than one and working for the same purpose. The examples
of de-facto standards include the driver’s seat side, the QWERTY keyboard system, the Adobe
Postscript language, Microsoft Word format for documents and etc. Personal computer did not
have a standard as it began to be manufactured in early 1980s. Various equipment was developed
by different manufactures, and they only could be used with their own particular system. IBM was
the dominant player in the industry and created a personal computer that encouraged other vendors
to make compatible equipment with IBM PC. De-facto standard was therefore created by IBM in
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computer industry.
The current situation exhibits that there are many SNS in the market, but a common standard does
not exist. The actors’ motivation for attracting customers is high due to the lack of standardization
that amplifies the market impact of network effects. Those who are successful in creating a large
installed base of customers seize the initial lead in the market. Nowadays, FB is counted as the
largest SNS. It has become a dominant actor. Despite the lack of standardization, each SNS is
operating on its own design architecture. Those architectures are considered to be independent and
acting as a standard for its own service. However, some of them have developed with interconnec-
tion to the largest providers. Several studies illustrates that some services allow users to log in with
their FB accounts. This enables the users to create a profile of duplicate information by transfer-
ring their account information from FB. The intension of providing a shortcut of registration is to
attract users using the services. Simultaneously, it may accelerate the dominant of the largest actor,
and the relevant technical characteristic of its standard may gradually become the standard of the
market.
4.1.2 Data portability
Several studies have revealed that a common standard of a technology may not follow the footstep
of the dominant provider. GSM standard was an example of creating a new standard regardless of
the market share of the existing actors. The main challenge in standardization of SNS is the pro-
prietary architecture of system. User information is generally not available for transferring among
services. It has been suggested that standardization of SNS can be realized by resolving the prob-
lem in data portability. This requires mechanism that for example can enable the portability of data
in each SNS. The technologies that support such mechanism are found in Semantic Web, as it is
suggested as an efficient solution in data portability.
Data portability enables user data to be reused between multiple services, in such a manner that
users’ access to different services is achieved. For instance, portability of identification including
personal profiles and lists of friends, users’ generated content including posts, comments, photos
and related data type, is needed to be implemented and deployed. To better achieve portability of
the user data, representation mechanisms are needed to establish interconnection between related
objects. Several studies have reported that[15], for providing mechanism mentioned above, the
Semantic Web offers representation mechanisms that meet the requirements. The Semantic Web is
defined as, “an extension of the current Web in which information is given well-defined meaning,
better enabling computers and people to work in cooperation.”[15]. Furthermore, the advantages of
the Semantic Web enable the interchange of infrastructure, information integration and innovative
way in reusing user data, as some of the restrictions of Web 2.01 can be solved. By combining the
semantics to Web 2.0 sites, it provides an interlinked web that SNS can collaborate and interconnect
using the same semantics. An enhanced view of interconnected SNS is therefore provided through
1Web 2.0 refers to a wide range of common web-based tools that used to strengthen the communication and inter-
connection between users. Examples of Web 2.0 include SNS, blog and etc.
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semantically-linked data.
There are several projects that contribute to achieve an interlinked environment of SNS based on
the technologies of the Semantic Web. Both the Friend-Of-A-Friend(FOAF)2 and Semantically-
Interlinked Online Communities(SIOC)3 project have shown their initiative by offering different
solution to meet the requirements of data portability[15]. Generally, FOAF defines an ontology in
such a manner that a user-profile and its relationships to others can be represented. In addition, it
also presents to be an entry point for individual user data across various SNS. Simultaneously, the
SIOC’s initiative is to describe the Web-based communication and content-sharing. User-created
content can be linked to related content through a SIOC import tool. This enables users, together
with FOAF; port all the user-created content from one SNS to another.
4.1.3 The ideal standard
Despite the advantages of the Semantic Web, process of development and implementation may be
costly and inefficient. Not all of the SNS have express structured information through open Appli-
cation programming interfaces(API) and microformats, and the restrictions remain to be improved.
The overall structure of SNS is not change despite the data is being portable. The servers of storing
user information are still proprietary. A user must have sign up for different accounts in order to
combine them together. The ideal standard of SNS may present an environment that information
will be shared between SNS. In other words, the proprietary solution of each SNS would not exist.
This may diminish the limitations and archive a more efficient way of interoperability. What a
standardization of SNS can offer are ideally listed as the following, (1) mutually interconnection of
users across different services with one single sign-in. (2) User-generated content can be available
across services. (3)SNS servers share the user data in such a manner that information integra-
tion and information adoption are successfully achieved. These specifications require a mutually
agreement of current SNS and technology contributions and adoption of each provider.
4.2 SNS- and standardization history
Despite the increasing popularity of SNS, it is still considered to be a relative new technology. The
development of SNS has been through several decades, but it was only in 2003 that SNS become
remarkably active for online socialization. And the possibility of interoperability has been a major
challenge from the beginning. Recently, several attempts have been made to realize the standard-
ization of SNS either through an agreed-upon protocol or third-party tool. However, approaches
of this kind carry with them various limitations and none of them have been successful deployed
globally. In order to better understand the reasons of major challenges behind SNS standardization,
the SNS and SNS standard history will be described as below.
2Friend-of-a-Friend - http://www.foaf-project.org
3Semantically-Interlinked Online Communities - http://sioc-project.org
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4.2.1 SNS history
The term SNS is defined as, a platform to build social networks or social relations among people
who share interests, activities or real life connections (ref). The first available services on internet
were Usenet groups and bulletin boards, as online communities to discuss about specific topics
4. In the year of 1995, TheGlobe.com5 was launched, and known as a form of generalized online
community. The purpose of the community was to bring people to interact by providing chat rooms
and online sharing of personal information and ideas. The technology was based on simple pub-
lishing tools and less costly or free web spaces.Later, social network site is distinguished from the
earlier form, and defined as, “a web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public
or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they
share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others
within the system.”[16]. It is clearly that the social networking site as part of the SNS provided a
more user-friendly and featured SNS. In the year of 1997, SixDegrees.com6 was launched in US, as
the first recognizable social network site[16]. Another example was Classmate.com7, as it enabled
people to interact with others from the same education facilities such as high school or college.
Simultaneously, SixDegrees was ahead in the market with its additional features of user-generated
personal profiles and list friends. It experienced a rapid growth in number of users in the later years.
At this period, SNS was initially few in number.
At this period, SNS was initially few in number. As the time passed, more providers came into
the market. A few years after the launch of SixDegrees, the number of SNS increased rapidly, as
more and more community tool provided various features of online social networking. It acceler-
ated the competition among SNS. Due to the lack of improved user-experience and competition,
SixDegrees closed its business in the year of 2000. The rise and fall of SixDegrees did not take
many years, as it gradually lost the attention from people. The launch of numerous community
tools spread worldwide during the years of 1997 to 2001. Many community tools refreshed them-
selves with various SNS features that distinguished themselves from each other8.
New generation of SNS began to flourish in the year of 2000. Remarkably, Ryze.com9 was
launched in the year of 2001. The main purpose of the service was to help people connect their
business networks. Likewise, Friendster came into the market in 2002 and being a social comple-
ment to Ryze and competitor to Match.com, it became a success and attracted numerous of users.
Surprisingly, it later suffered technical difficulties due to its increasing growth of users. Several
problems were also triggered by the exponential increasing popularity. User activities were regu-
lated by the stage of usage. Many phantom profiles were made in order to level up the user stage
and cross the restrictions. The popularity of the service faded gradually, as Friendster initially set
4http://connection.ebscohost.com/technology/social-networking-sites/history-online-social-networks
5http://www.theglobe.com
6http://www.sixdegrees.com
7http://www.classmate.com
8Examples include, LunarStorm in Sweden(D. Skog, personal communication, September 24, 2007).;Cyworld in
Korea;LiveJournal (B. Fitzpatrick, personal communication, June 15, 2007)and etc.
9http://www.ryze.com
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up measurements to hinder the profile-faking but it turned out to accelerate the collapse in users
interests.
Despite numerous SNS were launched from the year of 2003, the popularity was increasing con-
tinually. MySpace was launched in 2003, as a competitor for Friendster or similar. Users were
convinced to switch to MySpace from other SNS, especially Friendster, as rumors emerged about
a fee-based system that Friendster was going to adopt. Therefore, MySpace gained a large base
of users from estrangement of Friendster’s users. Additional, MySpace began to build its relation-
ship to users by supporting various users’ interests. Further, it expanded beyond Friendster and
added regularly features in order to provide better user experience. In the later years, MySpace
attracted millions of teenagers and became the majority of media attention globally. Despite the
fall of Friendster in U.S, it gained attention in other parts of the world, such as in South-East Asia
and Pacific Islands. Similarly, Chinese QQ10 grew rapidly in number of users and became the
biggest SNS. Other SNS such as LunarStorm in Sweden and Bebo11 in United Kingdom also de-
veloped to newer form and attracted more usage. Alongside these services, many blogging services
also began to include SNS features and became part of the market. FB came into the market in
2004. Initially, the main purpose of the service was to help people to connect with distinct college
or university networks. It was a Harvard-only SNS until it began to support other schools. Fur-
ther, it focused on growing globally and broadly with additional applications that enabled users to
customize user-profiles and other related features. From the early online communities to current
services, the development of SNS grew alongside its popularity. The history of SNS has illustrated
both rise and fall of distinct services in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: History of SNS
10http://www.qq.com
11http://www.bebo.com/
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4.2.2 Standardization history
As SNS are increasingly attracting majority of media attention and growing fast in number, people
realize that the standardization of SNS become more and more important. A number of attempts
have been made to realize standardization of SNS. One of the projects is the Data Portability
Project. In November 2007, the Data Portability Project was established by a group consisting
of people from all over the world. The project was found by Chris Saad12, and the majorities of
the project group is consisting of people who have work experience from various SNS. The inten-
tion of the project is to help people to reuse and secure their personal data on different SNS. It
allows portability of user-generated data across various SNS, thus create indirectly standardization.
The DataPortability project is a proponent organization that contributes toward the project’s goal.
W3C13, Open Web Foundation14 and similar organizations have relationship to this project.
As parts of the DataPortability project, several authentication systems such as OpenID15, OAuth16,
microformats and etc., are required to approach the goal. While OpenID offers federated login
that enables users to log on distinct SNS using OpenID without creating duplicate accounts, OAuth
provides a standard protocol that enables users to access personal resources across services with-
out exposing their account information. Together, a good solution of federated authentication and
portability of user personal information is provided. Open standard formats and protocols for APIs
enables standardization as providers choose to implement them into the services. However, the
project faces a number of legal and policy issues. Further research and formulation of a EULA’s
template and ToS agreements may solve the mentioned problem by defining the portability polices
for related providers.
Other contributions of standardization include for instance, FOAF project that started in 2000 by
Libby Miller and Dan Brickley, and SIOC that started in 2004 by John Breslin and Uldis Bojars.
FOAF provides an open and decentralized technology that enabling users to connect SNS. Further,
SIOC offers a uniform way of expressing user personal data generated at different SNS. Additional,
in cooperation of Google, Yahoo17 and MySpace, it proposed the OpenSocial foundation that de-
velopers can write social applications that enables accessibility of data from various SNS. It has
open for participation from anyone who wishes to contribute to the organization. Various projects
that found by either individual students or universities have also contributed to standardization of
SNS. Tent was a project that licensed by Massachusetts Institute of Technology(MIT), that devel-
ops a protocol that enables users to control their personal data even they change SNS provider.
It is mainly focus on distributed social network that is defined as decentralized and distributed
across various providers. OpenID authentication, XRD metadata are included for supporting the
technology. Many of the projects generate similar protocols and they are usually free and open.
12Chris Saad, co-Founder of APML.org, DataPortability.org, SynapticWeb.org and others. He is also currently VP
Strategy AboutEcho.com
13http://www.w3.org/Submission/2007/02
14http://www.openwebfoundation.org/
15http://openid.net/
16http://oauth.net/
17http://www.yahoo.com
Chapter 5
SNS Market Simulation
In this chapter, several assumptions for simulation are described and illustrated. Based on the
assumptions, The simulation is modeled with various settings of parameters. Additional, results
are compared and analyzed by sensitivity analysis.
5.1 Simulation Model
Before performing the simulation, some assumptions are described. To distinguish between the
following market types, it presents there different scenarios. Scenario I shows a market without
standardization, Scenario II illustrates a market with standardization and Scenario III presents a
market with both standardized and non-standardized providers.
5.1.1 Start conditions[4]
Homogenous service The service is the implemented in the same way by all providers in the
market.
Exclusive market Each user can maximally subscribe to one provider until the user switch to
another provider
Equal value Initially, the value and price is assumed to be the same on each product.
5.1.2 Basic parameters setting
Users The amount of total users is assumed to be 100 000.
Provider It is assumed that total providers in the market are four or two in each category based
on the market type.
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Initial user distribution Initial user distribution are categorized in 4 types. Each provider own
the same or different amount of users in the beginning based on scenario. In scenario I and II, Type
1 and Type 2 of initial user distribution are used, and they are illustrated in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2
. In scenario III, all types initial user distribution are illustrated. Type 3 and Type 4 are depicted in
Table 5.3 and Table 5.4.
Provider A B C D
Percentage of user distribution 25% 25% 25% 25%
Table 5.1: user distribution Type 1
Provider A B C D
Percentage of user distribution 45% 30% 10% 15%
Table 5.2: user distribution Type 2
Provider A B C D
Percentage of user distribution 10% 20% 10% 60%
Table 5.3: user distribution Type 3
Provider A B C D
Percentage of user distribution 10% 15% 45% 30%
Table 5.4: user distribution Type 4
Feedback It is assumed that the feedback is positive based on Polya’s urn problem illustrated in
Figure 5.1, and can be expressed as the following with parameter y,
pi,t =
Si,t
y
k
∑
j=1
S
y
j,t
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Figure 5.1: Polya’s urn problem
Time frame In order to estimate the development of the market, the time for each simulation is
assumed to be based on “the time for the accumulated volume to grow from 10% to 90%”[17].
The total time frame is assumed to be approximately 18 years. The overall parameter setting is
illustrated in Table 5.5.
Parameter Description Value
N Total number of users in the market 10 000
p The number of SNS provider 4
y Positive feedback parameter Based on market type
c Churning parameters Based on market type
R0 Initial user distribution at time = 0 Based on market type
 T
Time for the accumulated volume to
5
grow from 10% to 90%
E Number of Example churning 100
Table 5.5: Table of basic parameters setting
5.1.3 Scenario I, Without Standard
In Scenario I, the simulation is based on a market without a common standard.
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Individual parameters setting
Feedback According to chapter 2, a rational feedback of SNS is within the range of 1.0 to 2.0 de-
pending on the strength of network effects. Table 2.1 illustrates categorization of different network
effect valuation, and Metcalfe’s law applies usually to SNS.
Churning As a result of lock-in effects and negative feedback effects, churning is assumed to
be 30% for each SNS per year in the market. Due to the lack of standardization, users usually
experience different levels of lock-in to current providers, hence churning could be low.
5.1.4 Scenario II, With Standard
In Scenario II, the simulation is based on a standardized market. A common standard is deployed
and each SNS is interconnected with each other.
Individual parameters setting
Feedback Feedback is assumed to be 1.005 due to the reduction caused by standardization.
Churning Churning is assumed to be 50% for each SNS per year in the market. Due to the
standardization has reduced the effects of lock-in, churning in this case might be relative high.
5.1.5 Scenario III, Mix Market
In Scenario III, the simulation is based on a market that consists of both standardized and non-
standardized providers. Some of the providers participate into standardization, while the others do
not.
Individual parameters setting
Provider There are two types of providers, standardized and non-standardized. The scenario is
divided into two cases. In Case 1, there are two providers in each category. It is illustrated in Table
5.6. In Case 2, there is only one non-standardized providers, while the rest is standardized. Table
5.7exhibits the user distribution for Case 2.
Type Providers
Standardized A B
Non-standardized C D
Table 5.6: Providers distribution for Case 1
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Type Providers
Standardized A B C
Non-standardized D
Table 5.7: Providers distribution for Case 2
Feedback According to the parameters setting in scenario I and II, feedback 1 is assumed to be
1.2 and for non-standardized providers, while feedback 2 for standardized providers is assumed to
be 1.005.
Churning As a result of negative feedback effect, churning is assumed to be 50% between
standardized providers and defined as churning 1; 5% for churning from standardized to non-
standardized providers and define as churning 2; 30% for each non-standardized providers and
defined as churning 3; Churning 3 and churning 4 is the same churning value, but they differenti-
ated from which type of providers they go to. The overall churning is depicted in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: The overall churning of Scenario III
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5.2 Simulation Results
In this section, the results for three different scenarios are obtained from simulation and categorized
as below. The column diagrams exhibits the development of SNS providers during the given time
frame, and the development line diagram express the development flow, while the pie charts depict
the breakdown of development according to the percentage of accumulated users.
5.2.1 Scenario I, Without Standard
In scenario I, the market is without standardization. With feedback value at 1.4 and 1.9, and fixed
churning at 30%, the results are illustrated in figures below. Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 exhibit the
market development with column diagrams based on initial user distribution Type 1. Figure 5.5
is based on initial user distribution Type 2. Further, Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 display the detail
development for market with feedback 1.4, while Figure 5.8and Figure 5.9 display the detail devel-
opment for market with feedback 1.9. In addition, Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11 express the detail
development.
Figure 5.3: User distribution at different development time with feedback 1.4 illustrated in column
diagram
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Figure 5.4: User distribution at different development time with feedback 1.9 illustrated in column
diagram
Figure 5.5: User distribution with feedback 1.4 and initial user distribution Type 2, illustrated in
column diagram
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Figure 5.6: Market development with feedback 1.4
Figure 5.7: Market share distribution at 2.7th and 7.7th year with feedback 1.4
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Figure 5.8: Market development with feedback 1.9
Figure 5.9: Market share distribution at 2.7th and 7.7th year with feedback 1.9
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Figure 5.10: Market development with feedback 1.4 and initial user distribution Type 2
Figure 5.11: Market share distribution at 2.7th and 7.7th year with feedback 1.4 and initial user
distribution Type 2
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5.2.2 Sensitivity analysis for Scenario I, Without Standard
In this section, the sensitivity analysis presents and compares the variations of feedback based on
initial user distribution Type 1.
Feedback
Based on the predefined feedback 1.4, feedback varies between 1.1 and 2.0. Figure 5.12 displays
the user distribution. An incline of 0.1 at feedback value results in exponential growth in the number
of users of the dominant provider D. Simultaneously, the number of users of smaller providers such
as A, B and C, decreases rapidly. A dominant actor is found especially in when feedback is from
1.6 and above, as provider D captures more than 90% of total users. . The simulation results
indicate that the increasing of feedback causes an acceleration of winner-takes-it all situation, as
the feedback varies from 1.1 to 2.0. The results also show that the user distribution is relative
sensitive due to the alteration of feedback. The feedback is caused by positive network effects
that accelerates the growth of the provider with leading position and trigger the winner-takes-it-all
phenomena.
Figure 5.12: User distribution with different feedback
CHAPTER 5. SNS MARKET SIMULATION 49
5.2.3 Scenario II, With Standard
In scenario II, a common standard is deployed and the market is affected by standardization. With
churning at 50% and 100%, and fixed feedback at 1.005, the results are illustrated in figures below.
Figure5.13 and Figure 5.14 exhibit the market distribution among the providers at different time
based on churning at 50% and 100% with initial user distribution at 25% each provider based on
Type 1. Figure 5.15 is based on initial user distribution Type 2. Furthermore, Figure 5.16and Figure
5.17 display detail market development with churning 50%, while Figure 5.18 and Figure 5.19 are
based on churning 100%. Similarly, Figure 5.20 and Figure 5.21 express the detail development.
Figure 5.13: User distribution at different development time with churning 50% illustrated in col-
umn diagram
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Figure 5.14: User distribution at different development time with churning 100% illustrated in
column diagram
Figure 5.15: user distribution with churning 50% and initial user distribution Type 2, illustrated in
column diagram
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Figure 5.16: Market development with churning 50%
Figure 5.17: Market share distribution at 2.7th and 7.7th year with churning 50%
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Figure 5.18: Market development with churning 100%
Figure 5.19: Market share distribution at 2.7th and 7.7th year with churning 100%
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Figure 5.20: Market development with churning 50% and initial user distribution Type 2
Figure 5.21: Market share distribution at 2.7th and 7.7th year with churning 50% and initial distri-
bution Type 2
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5.2.4 Sensitivity analysis for Scenario II, Without Standard
In this section, the sensitivity analysis presents and compares the variations of churning based on
user distribution Type 1.
Churning Based on the predefined feedback 1.005, churning varies between 10% and 100%.
Figure 5.22 displays the user distribution based on various churning parameters. From the data in
Figure 5.22, it is apparent that the changes of churning parameter do not have a significant impact
on the market share distributions between providers. The distribution is constantly even from the
churning value at 10% to 100%. None of the providers has a dominant position during the market
development. There is a slightly increase of total users of some of the provider as the value of
churning increments, but there is not any difference greater than 10% of growth is observed. Com-
paring the results generated by different churning values, it can be seen that with a feedback value
at 1.005, the distribution of users is little sensitive due to the variation of churning parameter.
Figure 5.22: User distribution with different churning
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5.2.5 Scenario III, Mix Market
In scenario III, simulation results are illustrated with diagrams as below. The results are divided into
two cases. Case 1 and Case 2 are based on basic conditions that given in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7.
Figure 5.23, Figure 5.24, Figure 5.25 and Figure 5.26 depict the user distribution during different
simulation time. In addition, Figure 5.27 and Figure 5.28 display the detail market development for
Case 1 with initial user distribution Type 1. Figure 5.29 and Figure 5.40 illustrate the detail market
development for Case 2 with initial user distribution Type 3. Figure 5.31 and Figure 5.32 illustrate
the detail market development for Case 1 with initial user distribution Type 2, while Figure 5.33
and Figure 5.34 show the detail market development for Case 1 with initial user distribution Type
4.
Figure 5.23: User distribution during different time period for Case 1 with initial user distribution
Type 1
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Figure 5.24: User distribution during different time period for Case 2 with initial user distribution
Type 3
Figure 5.25: User distribution during different time period for Case 1 with initial user distribution
Type 2
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Figure 5.26: User distribution during different time period for Case 1 with initial user distribution
Type 4
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Figure 5.27: Market development for Case 1 with initial user distribution Type 1
Figure 5.28: Market share distribution for Case 1 with initial user distribution Type 1
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Figure 5.29: Market development for case 2 with initial user distribution Type 3
Figure 5.30: Market share distribution for Case 2 with initial user distribution Type 3
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Figure 5.31: Market development for Case 1 with initial user distribution Type 2
Figure 5.32: Market share distribution for Case 1 with initial user distribution Type 2
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Figure 5.33: Market development for case 1 with initial user distribution Type 4
Figure 5.34: Market share distribution for Case 1 with initial user distribution Type 4
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5.2.6 Sensitivity analysis for Scenario III, Mix Market
In this section, the sensitivity analysis presents and compares the variations of both feedback and
churning based on Case 1 with initial user distribution Type 1.
Feedback The variation of feedback is divided into 3 types. Type 1 display the sensitivity by
variation of all feedback values. Type 2 illustrates the sensitivity by variation of only one feedback
value(feedback of non-standardized providers), while the other remains fixed. Finally, Type 3 ex-
press the sensitivity by presenting equivalent feedback values. Table5.8, Table 5.9 and Table 5.10
exhibits the variations of feedback values in three categories.
Feedback 1 Feedback 2
1.4 1.1
1.6 1.2
1.8 1.3
2.0 1.4
Table 5.8: Type 1 of feedback values
Feedback 1 Feedback 2
1.6 1.005
1.8 1.005
2.0 1.005
Table 5.9: Type 2 of feedback values
Feedback 1 Feedback 2
1.2 1.2
1.4 1.4
Table 5.10: Type 3 of feedback values
From the data shown in figures below, once the values of feedback 1 and feedback 2 increase
simultaneously, it accelerates the growth of the dominant standardized provider and one of the
non-standardized providers. As more feedback 1 increases in value, the more users standardized
providers are able to capture. This can be referred to the situation in Scenario Iwhere the network
effects are the essential factor of emerging of dominant actor. Figure 5.35, Figure 5.36 and Figure
5.37 display how provider grows to be the dominant actor alongside with the increasing value of
feedback 1 and feedback 2.
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Figure 5.35: User distribution with different feedback values, Type 1
Figure 5.36: User distribution with different feedback values, Type 2
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Figure 5.37: User distribution with different feedback values, Type 3
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Churning Similarly, the variation of churning is divided into 4 types . Type 1 express the sen-
sitivity by increasing all churning. Type 2, Type 3 and Type 4 exhibit the sensitivity by variation
of only one churning value while the others remain fixed. Table 5.11, Table 5.12, Table 5.13 and
Table 5.14 illustrate the different variations of churning.
Figure 5.38 exhibits the user distribution at different level of churning. As the figure shown, the
higher the three churning variables increase in value, the more even the user distribution becomes
between provider A, B and C, while provider D in non-standardized market is driven out of the
market. It indicates that high churning also results a faster growth in number of users for some
SNS providers, as there is high probability the users switch to another SNS. Figure 5.39, Figure
5.40 and Figure 5.41 show the user distribution when only one of the churning values varies. Com-
paring the variation of churning 1, churning 2 and churning 3, the increment in churning 3 results
that standardized providers capture more and more users, while the change in churning 1 does not
show any significant difference greater than the differentiated percentage of churning value. There
is a obvious change of user distribution, while the value of churning 2 increase. The amount of
users for standardized providers decrease strongly as the value of churning increases with 10%.
Figure 5.38, Figure 5.39, Figure 5.40 and Figure 5.41 illustrate the detail market development for
Type 1, Type 2, Type 3 and Type 4 based on different churning values.
Churning 1 Churning 2 Churning 3
50% 5% 30%
60% 10% 40%
70% 20% 50%
80% 30% 60%
90% 40% 70%
Table 5.11: Type 1 of churning values
Churning 1 Churning 2 Churning 3
50% 5% 40%
50% 5% 60%
50% 5% 80%
Table 5.12: Type 2 of churning values
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Churning 1 Churning 2 Churning 3
60% 5% 30%
80% 5% 30%
100% 5% 30%
Table 5.13: Type 3 of churning values
Churning 1 Churning 2 Churning 3
50% 10% 30%
50% 40% 30%
50% 50% 30%
Table 5.14: Type 4 of churning values
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Figure 5.38: User distribution with different churning values, Type 1
Figure 5.39: User distribution with different churning values, Type 2
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Figure 5.40: User distribution with different churning values, Type 3
Figure 5.41: User distribution with different churning values, Type 4
Chapter 6
Business Model
Based on the Osterwalder’s Business Model[8], the strategy management of providers in three
market types will be presented.
6.1 Customer Segment
6.1.1 Scenario I, Without Standard
Large providers For providers with large installed base of users, the major customer segment is
people over the age of twelve, especially between the ages of 14 to 30, who are the most active
users on the internet. Additional, organizations, groups and business cooperation are one of the
customers, as they may participate into advertisement on SNS. For professionals such as application
developers, SNS may also be a platform for them to develop their business.
Small providers Generally, the customer segments for small providers will be similar to those
mentioned above. Some of them may include people that seek for particular purposes. For instance,
some providers that offer a meeting place for people to make a date, the customers will therefore
be those who are looking for a relationship.
6.1.2 Scenario II, With Standard
Large providers Similar to the non-standardized market, the main customer segment may be
people over the age 14. In order to capture more customers, it includes not only teenagers but
also whoever used to surf on internet. Companies and organizations are still one of the customer
segments, in addition to developers.
Small providers The customers will generally be similar to those listed above, it may focus on
capturing the forth group of customers as well.
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6.1.3 Scenario III, Mix Market
Non-standardized providers For providers that do not participate into standardization, their
main customers may be a specific group of users, specially people with common interests. Gener-
ally, the customers are a group with similar needs.
Standardized providers For standardized providers, the major customers would seem to be who-
ever the services can reach on internet. The providers are serving a mass and big market that in-
cludes everyone who are interested in using SNS. The general coverage of customer segments is
large.
6.2 Value Proposition
6.2.1 Scenario I, Without Standard
Large providers For the major customers of the service, providers create value through offering
various features in addition to the basic online social platform. For normal users, photo and event
sharing is usually the main features. Further, games may be provided to satisfy users’ need for
entertainment. For organizations and companies, targeted advertisements and statistics sales are
supplied. With a large base of users, the providers are able to offer application developers a market
to promote their games and applications.
Small providers Those mentioned values above may also be deployed by small providers. In
order to differentiate themselves in competition with large providers, small providers usually offer
distinct and customized features and membership. Such membership would be based on either
payment or users’ active time on the service. These approaches increase the exclusivity that large
providers are unable to offer, hence attract users to participate.
6.2.2 Scenario I, With Standard
Large providers Due to the limitations are diminished by standardization, the main focus of
value proposition is seem to be changed, as the position of large and small providers tend to be more
equal. In additional to the features mentioned above in a non-standardized market, large providers
may attempt to offer a more comprehensive service. To archive this purpose, large providers will
probably expand the coverage of current features. It can be applied to all kinds of subscribers,
including normal users, advertisers and developers.
Small providers With a smaller size of resources, expanding the current service to optimized
comprehensibility may not be a good strategy for small companies. Small providers appear to
provides their values through more effort in customization and personalization of the services. By
providing a unique and differentiated way of online social networking, it creates the main value
proposition.
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6.2.3 Scenario III, Mix Market
Non-standardized providers Providers may deliver value through a more enhanced and person-
alized online social networking platform. In order to distinguish themselves from standardized
providers, they appear to provide a more dedicated and customized service that satisfies different
individual needs. An outstanding technology and unique user experience would seem to be the
main value proposition.
Standardized providers With a common standard deployed among the providers, the values
mentioned above would generally be introduced, also the comprehensibility that support that varia-
tions of the service would be provided. A wider range of features will be offered to customers, thus
creating a comprehensive service that benefits the customers in different ways. With the increased
amount of various features and multiple functions, the service would be able to cover the most of
users need.
6.3 Channels and Customer Relationship
6.3.1 Scenario I, Without Standard
Large and small providers For both large and small providers, there are the same measure-
ments applied for both. Usually, providers promote themselves through various advertisements on
websites, games and other online platforms. Users can easily access SNS through different chan-
nels such as web portal and mobile phones. For advertisers, they can be reached by related sales
department of SNS providers. Providers are usually dedicated to maintain users’ loyalty through
enhancing the services with additional new features and updates and through contact in a way such
as FAQ.
6.3.2 Scenario II, With Standard
Large and small providers In order to provide a service that maximizes the comprehensibility,
providers appear to provide services through various channels. To ensure users can access SNS
anytime, providers will probably presents more integrated log-on protocols on other websites. A
full-featured and reliable application that not only apply to mobile phones but also other mobile
devices such as mobile tablet or pad, that enables users to access SNS anywhere, may help to deliver
the value proposition to users. Further, providers may offer various types of contacts that include
not only FAQ and online customer service, but also personalized customer service that based on
individual need. For instance, based on statistic of SNS usage for individual users, customized
electronic survey and personal assistance through telephones may be a good approach to better
reach customers need. For developers, supporting their copyrights on developed applications and
providing a reliable and inspiring platform is important.
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6.3.3 Scenario III, Mix Market
Non-standardized and standardized providers With and without a common standard solution,
all the mentioned channels and methods of customer relationship building above will generally
apply to the mix market.
6.4 Revenue Stream
6.4.1 Scenario I, Without Standard
Large and small providers For the most of the SNS providers, the revenue stream is generally
collected from two areas. Firstly, the main revenue comes from advertisements and promotions,
especially for the large providers. As the service creates its value by attracting a certain amount of
users, it also increases the willingness from advertisers to pay for advertisements. Secondly, some
SNS may charge users for membership or items of any exclusivity. A general item users normally
can utilize in using SNS is credit that enables access to various additional features and games.
6.4.2 Scenario II, With Standard
Large providers The main stream of revenue may be based on membership fee and various
advertisements. Instead of a winner-takes-it all situation that drives the main revenue toward adver-
tisements, standardization appear to diminish this phenomenon and the services will mainly collect
the revenue from users. User credits and exclusive membership fee may become the mainly revenue
resource.
small providers Unlike large providers, the effects of standardization may bring small providers
to utilize another method of collecting revenue. Small providers may distinguish themselves by
providing free membership or exclusivity based on the level of users activity. Therefore, they may
be more depending on revenue from advertisers.
6.4.3 Scenario III, Mix Market
Non-standardized providers The major revenue stream for providers may come from adver-
tisements and promotions. Additional fee for membership may not become the main stream of
revenue, as the providers are depending on the amount of users to gain benefits.
Standardized providers The revenue structure for standardized providers may become various.
Both advertisements and member fee is the main stream of revenue, but the focus on benefits from
advertisements would not dominate the general revenue.
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6.5 Cost Structure
6.5.1 Scenario I , Without Standard
Large providers and small providers The cost structure for most of the SNS providers is similar
and mostly including personnel cost, maintenance of physical equipment such as servers, R&D and
marketing.
6.5.2 Scenario II , With Standard
Large providers In general, the same cost structure mentioned above is applied to standardized
market. In order to increase the comprehensibility and possibility of customization of the services,
the main cost structure will probably be consisting of development, R&D and marketing.
Small providers To be able to provide a personalized and customized service, the cost structure
for small providers will probably be mainly consisting of development and personnel. This is the
cost from continually updates and maintenance of the service structure.
6.5.3 Scenario III, Mix Market
Non-standardized and standardized providers Generally, all the mentioned cost structure can
be applied to the mix market. Additional, for standardized providers, the cost of marketing may be
reduced due to standardization. On the other hand, the cost structure for non-standardized providers
will be clearly separated into development and marketing that including expenses on personnel and
R&D.
6.6 Key Partner, Key Resource and Key Activities
6.6.1 Scenario I , Without Standard
Large providers and small providers SNS providers have normally several partners, both al-
liance partners and supplier partners. The performance of SNS is relying on the physical servers,
and therefore there is need for creating a partnership with server supplier. Compatibility with mo-
bile equipment is also an important element, as mobile devices are becoming more significant for
distribution of SNS. Additional, alliance partners such as integrated services, application develop-
ers and external web portal are strategically important for SNS providers.
For value creation, SNS providers usually have three types of key resources. There are physi-
cal, human and intellectual assets. Physical assets include those servers and machines. While
human and intellectual assets consist of developers, administrative personnel, brand, knowledge,
copyrights and customer database.
The activity for SNS providers to achieve their value creation is through continuous development
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and improvement of existing platform. These will be performed by developers based on continuous
feedback and contact with customers. Innovative activity is also significant for further development,
and performed by the knowledge database of SNS providers.
6.6.2 Scenario II , With Standard
Large providers and small providers Both large and small providers have generally similar
partners in terms of technical and financial. Since the large providers have to ensure their resources
to provide certain level of service comprehensibility, they may be more willing to strengthen the
amount of key partners that support the services. The key partners may vary in such a manner that
the service is able to provide various functions in different ways. In contrast, small providers may
focus on some of the key partners in order to strengthen the service customization. The user group
and developers appear to become one of the most important key partners under such circumstances.
The main key resources for providers are generally similar to market without standardization. The
large providers may differentiate themselves from expanding their key resources in terms of phys-
ical and intellectual assets as well as current customer databases, while the main key resources for
small providers would seem to be human including developers, knowledge and copyrights.
The main activity in realizing an online social service is implementation of ideas and develop-
ment of technology. For large providers, development is the main focus of their activities, while
for small providers the interaction with users is the major activity.
6.6.3 Scenario III, Mix Market
Non-standardized and standardized providers Key partners for both non-standardized and
standardized providers may generally be similar. Alliance is important for standardized providers,
and the main key partners for standardized providers would seem to be those participators of stan-
dardization. It includes both SNS providers and other suppliers that directly or indirectly support
the common standard. For non-standardized providers, the key partners may be the team of devel-
opers, equipment and financial suppliers.
The installed base of users, knowledge and copyrights may be the important key resources for
non-standardized providers, while the standardized provider’s key resource is consisting of various
assets.
For both non-standardized and standardized providers, the key activity include mainly develop-
ment, innovation and implementation. These activities are performed by the successful cooperation
of both users and developers. Also, the management of service is necessary, in terms of resource
allocation and future planning. This is performed and operated by the administrative personnel.
Chapter 7
Game Theoretical Analysis
In this section, the simulated market will be analyzed based on the concept of game theory. The
values shown below are based on the simulation results in Scenario I, II and III in Chapter 5. The
total user amount for each type of providers is considered to be the value of the services, these
accumulated value on providers can be illustrated in the following tables.
Table 7.1 is based on initial user distribution Type 2, in where provider A and B are assumed
to be the large providers, and provider C and D are assumed to be the small providers. Table 7.2 is
based on Type 1, that presents an equal initial distribution of users. The values given in the tables
are based on the aggregated user amount for each type of providers from the simulation results.
Table 7.2 consists of Group 1 and Group 2 providers. Group 1 is a simplification of provider A and
B, while Group 2 includes provider C and D. Table 7.1 and Table 7.2illustrate the values of each
providers participates standardization regarding to each decision made by the opposite competitors.
While Table 7.3 and 7.4exhibits the management of strategies for large and small providers at dif-
ferent situation of the market.
Large providers
Small providers
Standardized Non-standardized
Standardized 33, 67 85, 15
Non-standardized 12, 88 3, 97
Table 7.1: Standardized or non-standardized?
Group 1 of providers
Group 2 of providers
Standardized Non-standardized
Standardized 50, 50 87, 13
Non-standardized 13, 87 21, 79 or 79, 21
Table 7.2: Standardized or non-standardized?
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As the Table 7.1, since the initial user distribution is uneven, the large providers usually lead the
market. But small providers still have a strictly dominant strategy and it is presented by entering
standardization regardless of the participation of large providers. Further, large providers’ best
response in this game is to remain non-standardized, as they have the dominant position in non-
standardized market. But it may leads to another problem if small providers enter standardization
and large providers do not follow. They would in this case lose their lead. However, it would be
wise for small providers to enter standardization regardless of the decision of large providers.
In Table 7.2 there is a significant difference while Group 1 or 2 make a decision that is oppo-
site to the competitor. Either Group 1 or Group 2 would seem to become dominant providers in the
market while one of them enters standardization and the others do not follow. Nash equilibrium is
therefore found, while both Group 1 and 2 participate standardization simultaneously, as the value
would seem to become approximately equal for both groups of providers and no dominant strategy
is found. The finding shows that participation of standardization would seem to be a relative good
coordination between both groups of providers.
As the analysis illustrates above, due to the different levels of installed base of users, small providers
appear to benefit from standardization. While large providers would seem to remain non-standardized
until the emergence of standardization. Under the equal condition of initial user distribution,
providers would seem to prefer standardization, as the coordination would rather benefit them from
a sustainable and equal development. Table 7.3 and Table 7.4 illustrate the main strategic manage-
ment of large and small providers in both non-standardized and standardized market.
Large providers
Non-standardized
Provide basic and general platform
Offer continuous development
Build reputation and brand
Focus on advertisements and promotions
Standardized
Provide comprehensive service
Increase resource in development
Build reputation and brand
Build alliance
Expand scale
Table 7.3: Strategic management for large providers
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Small providers
Non-standardized
Provide innovative solution
Allocate limited resource to development
Build alliance with other providers
Focus on payment business
Standardized
Provide personalization and customization
Increase resource in customization
Increase advertisements
Build reputation and copyrights
Build alliance
Table 7.4: Strategic management for small providers
Chapter 8
Conclusion and Further Work
In this chapter, it will first conclude the study and finding in previous chapters and followed by the
suggested further work.
8.1 Conclusion
This thesis has presented the main theoretical concepts and analysis method related to SNS indus-
try, which include network and churning effects, business model and game theory. Definitions of
technical standards and SNS standard are described. Based on the simulation results generated by
DEMOS SIMULA, a sensitivity analysis of market is also introduced. A business model and game
theoretical analysis is proposed to present the empirical findings and research for market impact of
realization of SNS standardization.
As an example of technical standards, mobile telecommunication standards are presented and fol-
lowed by the standardization history. A comparison of possible SNS standards are listed based on
the current situation, also followed by the history of standardization attempt of SNS.
The simulation model and concepts are based on different market scenarios. Firstly, the results
from scenario I show that the absence of standardization may lead to a winner-takes-it-all market,
the increased of network effects would seem to accelerate this phenomena. Secondly, from the
results in scenario II there is a clear trend of a more evenly market distribution between distinct
providers. Finally, the results from scenario III presents a mix market that shows the standardized
providers obviously benefits from the competition with non-standardized providers. This also lead
to the dominant provider would seem to lose its leading position if it refuses to enter standardiza-
tion while the others do.
A business model addresses the strategic elements and game theoretical analysis presents a de-
cision management of distinct types of providers based on the previous findings.
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8.2 Further Work
As the simulation results are mainly based on the variation of network effects and churning, a wider
combination of these parameters should be considered to present a more comprehensive market
analysis. It would improve the market simulation in different way.
This thesis has study several possible types of SNS standard and it may be an interesting extension
for further study. It can be measured by further research of implementation of SNS standardization.
A broader study of standard-related protocols that needed in order to realized a common standard
of SNS would also be a significant step in terms of establishing technical specifications of SNS
standard. It should also include a study of implementation of a prototype of common standard that
enabling interoperability. Furthermore, A more broader study of current solutions of SNS standard
regardless of geographical area should be taken into account in further work.
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Source Code
This section contains the programming code used in DEMOS for simulation purpose. It contains
SIMULA code for generating a simulation for various market type that described above. An exam-
ple of parameters is also listed below.
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NumberActors
4
NumberActorsWi thStandard
2
NumberAc to rWi thou tS tandard
2
S t a r t C u s t o m e r s I n%
0 . 1 0 0 . 1 5 0 . 4 5 0 . 3 0
FeedBackParamete r
1 . 2
1 .005
ChurnPerYear In%
50
5
30
D e l t a T i A a r
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Appendix
The appendix include all the related data in the thesis.
Scenario I - Without Standard
Years Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D
0 25% 25% 25% 25%
2.73 29% 16.94% 24.19% 29.86%
7.74 33.20% 4.65% 15.79% 46.36%
18.33 21.98% 0.43% 3.37% 74.21%
Table 8.1: user distribution at different development time with feedback 1.4
Years Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D
0 25% 25% 25% 25%
2.73 28.24% 8.14% 23.42% 40.19%
7.74 2.93% 0.26% 1.53% 95.28%
18.33 0.12% 0.01% 0.06% 99.81%
Table 8.2: user distribution at different development time with feedback 1.9
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BIBLIOGRAPHY 94
Feedback
User’ distribution (%) at 100% of accumulated users
Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D
1.1 29.51 13.31 23.44 33.75
1.2 31.66 5.89 18.19 44.27
1.3 29.04 1.56 10.62 58.78
1.4 21.98 0.45 3.37 74.21
1.5 8.29 0.11 1.42 90.18
1.6 3.10 0.04 0.49 96.38
1.7 0.69 0.02 0.20 99.09
1.8 0.28 0.02 0.12 99.58
1.9 0.12 0.01 0.06 99.81
2.0 0.08 0.01 0.04 99.88
Table 8.3: Sensitivity analysis of feedback
Scenario II - With Standard
Years Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D
0 25% 25% 25% 25%
2.73 24.63% 24.74% 25.60% 25.40%
7.74 23.75% 23.77% 26.30% 26.18%
18.33 23.61% 23.69% 26.82% 25.88%
Table 8.4: user distribution at different development time with churning 50%
Years Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D
0 25% 25% 25% 25%
2.73 26.84% 27.93% 22.26% 22.97%
7.74 27.18% 27.97% 22.09% 22.77%
18.33 27.93% 27.36% 22.12% 22.56%
Table 8.5: user distribution at different development time with churning 100%
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Churning
User’ distribution (%) at 100% of accumulated users
Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D
10% 27.87 24.42 23.24 24.48
20% 27.82 22.17 24.29 25.72
30% 27.18 19.02 24.88 28.93
40% 23.98 20.63 28.96 26.44
50% 23.61 23.69 26.82 25.88
60% 26.70 23.49 21.95 27.86
70% 28.69 17.80 26.22 27.29
80% 25.17 22.85 30.40 21.59
90% 24.15 24.30 25.35 26.20
100% 27.93 27.36 22.15 22.56
Table 8.6: Sensitivity analysis of churning
Scenario III - Mix Market
Years Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D
0 25% 25% 25% 25%
2.73 36.90% 39.15% 11.84% 12.11%
7.74 39.78% 47.23% 6.00% 6.99%
18.33 39.53% 46.23% 5.44% 8.80%
Table 8.7: user distribution at different development time, Case 1, Type 1
Years Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D
0 10% 20% 10% 60%
2.73 12.82% 31.81% 16.83% 38.54%
7.74 11.92% 50.34% 19.15% 18.60%
18.33 12.19% 53.62% 19.81% 14.38%
Table 8.8: user distribution at different development time, Case 2, Type 3
Years Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D
0 45% 30% 10% 15%
2.73 60.89% 26.29% 2.57% 10.26%
7.74 70.53% 17.92% 0.47% 11.09%
18.33 69.58% 16.22% 0.01% 14.19%
Table 8.9: user distribution at different development time, Case 1, Type 2
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Years Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D
0 10% 15% 45% 30%
2.73 18.85% 43.31% 22.54% 15.30%
7.74 18.92% 66.20% 10.86% 4.02%
18.33 18.76% 66.96% 13.68% 0.60%
Table 8.10: user distribution at different development time, Case 1, Type 4
Feedback
User’ distribution (%) at 100% of accumulated users
Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D
1.2 and 1.005 39.53 46.23 5.44 8.80
1.1 and 1.4 68.62 17.22 12.50 1.66
1.6 and 1.2 84.92 0.94 14.14 0.00
1.8 and 1.3 85.66 0.22 0.00 14.12
2.0 and 1.4 85.88 0.01 14.11 0.00
Table 8.11: Sensitivity analysis, Type 1 of feedback
Feedback
User’ distribution (%) at 100% of accumulated users
Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D
1.2 and 1.005 39.53 46.23 5.44 8.80
1.6 and 1.005 59.98 25.88 14.14 0.00
1.8 and 1.005 55.27 30.60 0.00 14.13
2.0 and 1.005 75.65 10.24 14.11 0.00
Table 8.12: Sensitivity analysis, Type 2 of feedback
Feedback
User’ distribution (%) at 100% of accumulated users
Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D
1.2 and 1.005 39.53 46.23 5.44 8.80
1.2 and 1.2 31.10 54.66 4.70 9.54
1.4 and 1.4 85.70 0.14 1.18 12.98
Table 8.13: Sensitivity analysis, Type 3 of feedback
Churning
User’ distribution (%) at 100% of accumulated users
Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D
50%, 5% and 30% 39.53 46.23 5.44 8.80
60%, 10% and 40% 33.25 46.76 19.89 0.10
70%, 20% and 50% 35.82 35.60 22.76 5.80
80%, 30% and 60% 38.37 28.29 33.33 0.00
90%, 40% and 70% 27.15 36.49 36.36 0.01
Table 8.14: Sensitivity analysis, Type 1 of churning
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Churning
User’ distribution (%) at 100% of accumulated users
Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D
50%, 5% and 30% 39.53 46.23 5.44 8.80
50%, 5% and 40% 47.18 41.73 9.15 1.94
50%, 5% and 60% 45.29 47.02 0.00 7.69
50%, 5% and 80% 46.82 47.29 0.00 5.88
Table 8.15: Sensitivity analysis, Type 2 of churning
Churning
User’ distribution (%) at 100% of accumulated users
Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D
50%, 5% and 30% 39.53 46.23 5.44 8.80
60%, 5% and 30% 52.04 33.71 1.09 13.16
80%, 5% and 30% 41.76 44.00 9.13 5.11
100%, 5% and 30% 37.93 47.83 4.23 10.01
Table 8.16: Sensitivity analysis, Type 3 of churning
Churning
User’ distribution (%) at 100% of accumulated users
Provider A Provider B Provider C Provider D
50%, 5% and 30% 39.53 46.23 5.44 8.80
50%, 10% and 30% 29.31 30.70 3.14 36.86
50%, 40% and 30% 26.50 16.36 21.01 36.14
50%, 50% and 30% 20.36 17.13 59.554 2.947
Table 8.17: Sensitivity analysis, Type 4 of churning
